When a key responsibility of a manager is to allocate more or less attractive tasks to subordinates, these subordinates have an incentive to work hard and demonstrate their talents. As a new manager is less well acquainted with these talents this incentive mechanism is reinvigorated after a management change -but only when the team is sufficiently homogenous. Otherwise, a new manager quickly makes similar choices as the old one did. We investigate this hypothesis using a large data set on coach dismissals in the German football league where the selection of players is indeed a key task of the coach. Indeed, we find substantial evidence that coach replacements enhance team performance (only) in homogenous teams. Moreover, from a methodological point of view, we argue that there is typically a negative selection bias when evaluating succession effects, which might reconcile previous findings of no (or even negative) effects with the vast number of dismissals observed in reality.
Introduction
In many organizations, the dismissal of a manager is typically triggered by unsatisfactory performance of the unit (e.g. team, subdivision) for which the manager is responsible.
Consequently, in replacing the current manager by a new one, executives hope for enhanced performance. But whether and how a new manager can affect a firm's or a team's performance intricately depends on the role of the manager within the organization. In this paper we study a particular channel through which a manager can affect performance, namely through the selection of team members and its effects on within-team competition for attractive positions. Höffler and Sliwka (2003) have analyzed within-team competition in a theoretical model in which a manager picks among team members to fill an important position.
The paper builds on Lazear and Rosen's (1981) tournament theory and endogenizes a manager's selection choice under incomplete information about individuals' ability or talent. When a manger has been in place before she knows the abilities of the team members quite well and therefore should have a clear idea in mind who should be picked.
In turn, competition for being selected is weaker. When, however, a new manager is brought in from outside this new manager knows less about the respective abilities and in turn, within-team competition is reinforced. But whether a management replacement can indeed trigger such a push in incentives crucially depends upon the composition of the team. In particular, when team members differ strongly in their abilities the new manager will most certainly pick the same individuals as the old manager had -in this case dismissals only have weak effects in this respect. But if the team composition is more homogenous, management replacements are more effective in reinvigorating within-team competition.
On a more general level, this prediction builds on a theoretically robust mechanism that has been established across a large number of models on asymmetric contests and tournaments, in which it has been shown that equilibrium efforts tend to be the higher the more symmetric (and hence the more competitive) the contest.
1 From this perspective the dismissal of a manager can be viewed as an instrument to reduce the asymmetries in contests.
We study this question empirically in an area where the selection of subordinates for important tasks is one of the core responsibilities of a manager, namely in professional team sports. To do this we are using a large data set on the German Bundesliga, one of the biggest soccer leagues in the world. A key task of a head coach in soccer is the selection of the starting line-up of 11 players for each game from a larger number (on average 25) players employed by the respective club. As the players' career advancement, their popularity and often also their remuneration depend crucially on the number of matches in which they were being fielded, competition among team members for these positions is an important element of team sports. The dismissal of the coach now should have a substantial impact on the nature of this within-team competition. It is the key purpose of this paper to test empirically whether indeed dismissals have a stronger effect on performance in teams which are homogenous with respect to the abilities of the team members.
In general the empirical evaluation of management dismissals is non-trivial because of a number of caveats: First, there is often a lack of available performance measures for managers' unit of control. In addition, managerial change either occurs rarely and/or is often accompanied by further changes in the surrounding conditions, which obscures the identification of the causal succession effect. Furthermore, organizations will typically be heterogenous with respect to a number of crucial dimensions which makes it difficult to assess the contribution of a single manager. And last but not least, dismissal decisions are unlikely to be random, but often occur after a period of low performance. When part of the actual performance is outside a manager 's control ("luck"), then the organization's expected performance may increase after managerial change simply because of mean 1 See e.g. O'Keeffe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984) , Lien (1990) , Baik (1994) , Gradstein (1995) , Nti (1999) , Clark and Riis (2000) , Szymanski and Valletti (2005) , Moldovanu and Sela (2006) , and Feess, Muehlheusser, and Walzl (2008) . Moreover, the literature has also considered the issue of excluding weak contestants as to not dilute the incentives of their stronger counterparts (see e.g. Fullerton and McAfee, 1999; Taylor, 1995; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). reversion.
2
In response to these difficulties, a major part of the existing literature has aimed at measuring succession effects in the context of professional team sports. Apart from being of interest in its own right, the sports sector is long recognized as a valuable "labormarket laboratory" (Kahn, 2000) and it is particularly well-suited for the analysis of succession effects. In particular, in European soccer, managerial changes occur rather frequently and, in most cases they occur within a season (i.e. between two match days).
In the German Bundesliga, in a given season of our observation period (17 seasons from 1993 -2009), on average 48% of all teams experienced at least one within-season managerial change. A key benefit of within season replacements for the purpose of the evaluation of dismissal effects is that most other crucial determinants for team success (e.g., composition of roster or team budget) remain constant between two match days.
3
There now exists a large number of empirical studies which have attempted to assess the effects of management changes in professional sports. Early studies typically use seasonal data from U.S. sports leagues (and hence mainly consider between-season managerial change), and the evidence is mixed: Grusky (1963) , Theberge and Loy (1976) , and Allen, Panian, and Lotz (1979) do find a negative relationship between managerial change and the performance in different U.S. sports leagues. Other studies do not find a statistically significant effect and interpret this as evidence in favor of 'ritual scapegoating' (Gamson and Scotch, 1964; McPherson, 1976; Brown, 1982) . A final set of studies does find a mild positive effect (Gamson and Scotch, 1964; Fabianic, 1994; McTeer, White, and Persad, 1995) where the measured effects are typically stronger in the short run and often vanish shortly after the replacement takes place.
4 However, the older studies often do not fully account for performance prior to dismissals and are prone to mean-reversion effects (i.e. if a coach is dismissed after a series of losses the probability of a performance increase is necessarily larger). In more recent studies match-level data is used which allows to directly control for the prior performance of each team and account for mean reversion. In particular, the large bulk of studies of different European soccer leagues either find detrimental (e.g. Bruinshoofd and ter Weel, 2003; Audas, Goddard, and Dobson, 1997; Audas, Dobson, and Goddard, 2002) or no effects (e.g. Koning, 2003; De Paola and Scoppa, 2012) , while only de Dios Tena and Forrest (2007) provide some evidence for performance increases after a dismissal. But surprisingly, most of these studies still lack a clean discussion of biases due to the endogeneity of coach dismissals beyond potential mean-reversion effects.
Our paper adds to the literature in two respects.
First of all, we analyze in more detail potential selection effects and argue that the typical approaches (including our own) tend to underestimate the effects of coach dismissals. The reason is that the effect of a dismissal is typically identified by comparing the average performance of teams dismissing the coach with the performance of non-dismissing teams who exhibit similar values for a set of observable variables. This would identify a causal effect if the (counterfactual) performance of teams with dismissals was identical to the performance of non-dismissing teams with the same set of observables. As we show in a simple model in which the executives who decide on the dismissal of the manager receive a private signal that contains additional information on the benefits of a dismissal, this will typically not be the case under very plausible assumptions: the fact that a team dismissed a manager reveals unfavorable information about the future performance without a dismissal. Hence, the conditional expectation about counterfactual performance of the team who dismissed the coach should therefore be smaller than the performance of the teams who did not dismiss the coach in the same situation. In turn, the typical estimates should give a lower bound on the true effects of coach dismissals. Hence, from these considerations we can reconcile the two apparently contradictory observations in the previous literaturei.e. that coach dismissals were estimated to be mostly useless, but that there are still so many of them.
5
But more importantly, while nearly all other studies investigate the average consequences of coach dismissals in soccer, our approach is to study under which contingencies a dismissal can be expected to be beneficial. In particular we study the importance of the team composition prior to the dismissal. Indeed we find that teams who replaced their coach significantly increase their performance as compared to other teams exhibiting the same set of observables -but only when the team is sufficiently homogenous prior to the dismissal. Given the above arguments that we identify a lower bound to the true effects, we conclude that coach dismissals on average have substantially positive performance effects in homogenous teams. Moreover, we also investigate the effect of coach dismissals on the performance of individual players and show that individual performance increases to a stronger extent in homogenous teams and among players on the contested ranks,
i.e. for those players who compete for a position in the starting line-up. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no empirical evidence so far concerning the impact of heterogeneity in the context of dismissals and our analysis reveals that this is a key factor determining the success of a replacement. Moreover, our results are consistent with recent findings from the empirical literature on asymmetric contests which often finds a negative correlation between effort levels and the degree of heterogeneity of contestants (see e.g. Schotter and Weigelt, 1992; Orrison, Schotter, and Weigelt, 2004; Lynch, 2005; Brown, 2011; Sunde, 2009; Berger and Nieken, 2010; Nieken and Stegh, 2010) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out empirical framework. In Section 3 we present our empirical results concerning the impact of coach dismissals on the performance of teams and individual players. Section 4 discusses our findings and concludes.
5 Note that dismissals are rather expensive for teams as the sacked manager is entitled to receive his wage until his contract would have expired. In many cases, teams and managers agree on a severance payment in exchange for mutual cancelation of the contract.
Empirical Framework

Institutional Background and Data
Our aim is to estimate to what extent the effect of a coach dismissal depends upon team heterogeneity. But a key challenge is of course the potential endogeneity of the dismissal itself. Coach dismissals are not exogenously imposed and will typically be driven by the (observed) performance history of a team but may also be influenced by (unobserved) private information of the club's management on the future performance of the team.
Hence, a careful discussion of potential selection effects is of crucial importance for any study of management dismissals with observational data. But first, it is important to understand the structure of the data we use and the basic econometric approach.
The German Bundesliga consists of 18 teams, and each team plays twice against each other team (one home match each) resulting in 34 match days per season and 306 matches overall. In each match, a winning (losing) team is awarded 3 (0) points. In case of a draw, each team is awarded 1 point and teams are ranked according to their accumulated points.
6 At the end of the season, the team with the highest number of points wins the championship (there are no playoffs), while the two resp. three teams with the lowest number of points are delegated to the second division and replaced by the best two resp. three teams from that division. 7 Both the league winner and the second best team are automatically qualified to participate in the highly prestigious UEFA Champions League in the subsequent season; the third best team has also the chance of participation by prevailing in a preliminary tournament against corresponding teams from other European leagues. The teams ranked fourth and fifth participate in the UEFA Euro League (so does the third best team, in case it fails to quality for the Champions League). The incentives (both financially and with respect to reputation) to 6 When several teams have accumulated the same number of points, the goal difference is used as the tie-breaking rule.
7 For the seasons 1992/93 -2007/08, the three teams at the bottom were relegated. For the season 1991/92, the league was enlarged to 20 teams (due to the German re-unification) and four teams were relegated. As of season 2008/09, the team ranked third to last and the team ranked third in the second division compete in two extra matches for the final Bundesliga slot for the next season. qualify for one of the two UEFA leagues are very strong, the same is true for avoiding relegation.
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The unit of observation in our data set is a specific match. The data set contains all matches played in the German Bundesliga for the 17 seasons from 1993/94 until 2009/10 (9 matches played on each of 578 match days leading to a total of 5.202 matches). For each match, we have detailed information about match-and team-specific characteristics, as well as the involved managers and players. For most of the analysis, the dependent variable is the number of points y ijt won by the home team in a match between home team i and away team j at match day t. As there are three possible match outcomes, home team win, draw or away team win, resulting in 3 (0), 1 (1) or 0 (3) point(s), respectively, for the home (away) team, both teams have a strictly monotone (but reversed) preference order with respect to it.
Identification and Selection Bias
We estimate by OLS a number of regression models of the following form 9 : On the other side of the spectrum, relegation typically comes along with severe budgets cuts, which is due to lower TV fees (on average 18.5 million Euro per season in the Bundesliga versus 4.9 million in the lower division), gate revenues and merchandizing revenues. As a consequence, teams are forced to sell some (in many cases most) of their best players.
9 Estimating ordered probit models leads to virtually identical results. See e.g. Angrist and Pischke (2008, pp. 107 ) for a critical discussion on the use of linear and non-linear models when the outcome of interest is a limited dependent variables.
in detail below). The dummy new τ it (new τ jt ) indicates whether, prior to match day t, the home (away) team's manager is "new" in the sense that he has been hired within the last τ home (away) matches of the home (away) team. Throughout, we will consider three different time horizons τ ∈ {2, 4, 6} for the effects of managerial change to materialize.
Overall, there are 197 dismissals in our sample, out of which 146 occurred within a season.
In 26 out of these 146 cases, the new manager was (and was ex ante known to be) an interim solution, supposed to step down as soon as the "true" successor was available.
These were dropped from the main analysis, which leaves us with 120 within-season dismissals.
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As for the causal effect of a dismissal, it is crucial to consider the underlying conditional independence assumption. To save on notation, define X ijt = (X it , X jt , new jt ) and Y ijt = (Y it , Y jt ) which contain all relevant match-specific covariates. Moreover, denote by y ijt (1) the outcome for team i upon dismissing its manager, and by y ijt (0) the (potentially counterfactual) outcome when there is no dismissal. Then, our approach allows is to identify a causal effect of a dismissal
That is, conditional on the observed control variables the counterfactual performance of dismissing teams in case of non-dismissal should be equal to the performance teams who did not dismiss the coach in the same situation. Intuitively, the effect of a coach dismissal is here estimated by comparing the performance of teams who recently dismissed the coach with the performance of other teams who did not dismiss the coach under the same set of observables.
A first potential endogeneity issue that has already been acknowledged in the previous literature is that dismissals are typically triggered by low team performance in the last games prior to the dismissal. A performance increase after a dismissal may then, for 10 In our sample, the average spell duration of interim managers was 2.3 matches. In section 3.3 below, we will use the performance of teams playing under interim managers as a robustness check for our main results.
instance, be simply be a mean reversion phenomenon. Since this is a selection issue based on observable variables (past performance), we account for this by following a laggeddependent variable approach, where the vectors Y it and Y jt contain the following variables for each team:
11 First, we take into account a team's long-term performance history, measured by the average league position in the last three seasons (PerfHist). Second, as a measure for a team's performance in the current season, we use the average number of points accumulated in the season up to the match under consideration. Because there is typically a considerable difference between a team's performance in home and away matches (see Table 1 below), we distinguish between the two match types (homePerf and awayPerf ) for both the home and the away team. Finally, as each team's exact sequence of outcomes in the most recent games can be crucial for both -the decision to dismiss a coach and the pattern of mean reversion -we employ a saturated approach concerning the most recent performance by including dummy variables to indicate its exact performance history in the last four matches 12 , thereby allowing for non-linearities.
In this sense, we come close to a matching approach comparing teams with identical short-term performance histories.
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Finally, the vectors X it and X jt in Eqn.
(1) contain a proxy of each team's respective relative annual budget (budget), that is, an estimate of its absolute budget divided by the average absolute budget in the league in a given season. We use this as a measure for a team's ability to attract top players. 14 Finally, we include a dummy variable indicating 11 An alternative strategy would be to use team fixed-effects. However, a fixed effects model with lagged dependent variables leads to inconsistent estimates, see Nickell (1981) and also Angrist and Pischke (2008, pp. 243) . As controlling for recent performance prior to the dismissal is very important to reduce selection issues, we prefer the lagged dependent variable approach. However, fixed effects models lead to qualitatively very similar results.
12 As shown in panel (a) of Figure 4 below, teams dismissing a coach indeed exhibit a particular performance pattern in the four games prior to the dismissal.
13 For example, the home team's recent performance history prior to match day t is (y it−1 , y it−2 , y it−3 , y it−4 ), where y it−k ∈ {3, 1, 0} for k = 1...4 denotes the number of points gained in the match played k match days before match day t. Proceeding analogously with the away team leads to 3 4 = 81 of such history dummies for each team.
14 Note that football teams in Germany are not obliged to publish their budgets -hence the information we use are estimates compiled from public sources. However, as core parts of a team's income such as TV revenues, revenues from participation in the UEFA Leagues, ticket sales, and sponsoring are in large parts publicly reported, these estimates, while being noisy, are likely to reflect the relative financial whether a match is crucial for the respective team.
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Even though we control for the past performance of each team in a detailed manner, assumption expressed in Eqn. (2) will still clearly be violated when the firing decision is based on unobservable variables determining the expected future performance of a team under its current or a new manager. For example, executives who decide on a dismissal will typically have observed further information (for instance from communication with influential players or by observing the team also between games) that should influence their decision. An important question is, for instance, whether a performance dip is only due to bad luck, while the team is in principle still in "good hands" under the current manager, or whether his relationship with the team is substantially disturbed.
To see that consider the following simple model. Suppose that prior to match day t the executive receives a private signal s it which contains some additional information on the team's expected subsequent performance, and that the latter is increasing in the signal, i.e.
Suppose now that the coach will be dismissed (and thus new it = 1) if and only if
sufficiently small. In turn, this leads to a critical signal values (X ijt , Y ijt ) such that the coach is dismissed if and only if s it <s (X it , Y it ). But then
Hence, the conditional independence assumption (2) is violated and the estimates will be biased. But these considerations also lead to another insight, namely that the selection bias
is negative, and thus coefficients obtained from estimating specification (1) will be constrengths of the clubs within a season. All our results remain qualitatively robust when this variable is omited.
servative in the sense that they under-estimate the true average treatment effect. The reason is that the teams in which managers are fired are those, whose performance under the old manager would be particularly low (as otherwise they would not have dismissed him). Those teams who did not fire the coach in the same situation should on average have a better performance -in turn, the true performance effect from a dismissal must be larger than the difference in performance between the dismissing and the non-dismissing teams.
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Note that these considerations help to resolve a puzzle in the prior discussion about the effect of coach dismissals as there are two contradictory patterns: on the one hand, within-season dismissals are very frequent. 17 But on the other hand, the existing studies mostly find negative or no effects of these dismissals, which would suggest highly irrational behavior on the part of the club executives because of the large cost associated with a dismissal in the form of payments to the outgoing coaches.
18 As we have now argued, studies with observational data will most likely underestimate the effect of a dismissal. Hence, it may well be the case that coach dismissals may indeed be more effective than previously thought. Moreover, the benefits of dismissals may depend on the degree of team heterogeneity. And it is this conjecture that we now explore in the remainder of this paper.
Measuring Team Heterogeneity
Our key hypothesis is that coach dismissals are more beneficial when teams are homogenous. In the regression model (1), the variables het it and het jt are measures for team heterogeneity which are constructed as follows: We use performance grades which are assigned to individual players in each game on a 10 points scale where a higher value indicates a better performance. 19 In each match, each team fields 11 players, and it can replace up to three of these by players on the bench in the course of a match. 20 For each team and each match day, we compute the average grade for each of its players in all matches prior to the match day and then rank players according to these average grades.
Thereby, two groups of players will be of particular interest: those on rank positions 8 to 11 (i.e., the weakest ones among the top 11 players) and those at rank positions 12 to 15 (i.e., the strongest contenders), and the average grades of these two groups are denoted by G Teams alternate between home and away matches from one match day to the next. Given the different nature of the two match types (e.g., in terms of the result or playing strategy), it seems reasonable to take into account matches of either type when approximating the team heterogeneity which the new manager inherits from the old one. However, our results would not qualitatively change when using a different rule such as the predecessor's last match only or his last three or four matches. In any case, for our question of interest, the chosen measure of heterogeneity should be unaffected by selection policy of the new coach.
wins in about half of matches, while the other half is evenly split between draws and wins of the away team. Annual (relative) budgets are ranging from one third of the average budget to more than twice as much, which indeed suggests that teams are highly heterogeneous with respect to their ability to attract good players.
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There are no roster limits in the German Bundesliga and teams have rosters of up to 35. The average roster size is 25, i.e. the average team contracts with approximately twice as many players as it can field in a single match. While also the possibility of injuries needs to be taken into account, this suggests that within-team competition for the scarce slots in the squad is an importance aspect in this context. 24 In fact, Figure 1 shows that match participation is strongly driven by players' rank within the roster in terms of prior performance, where for example, players in the top ranks are fielded more than three times as often as those on the lowest ranks. Table 1 also shows that teams differ strongly with respect to our (normalized) measure of heterogeneity based on grades (het): For example, the degrees of heterogeneity in the 90th-and 10th-percentile of the distribution differ by a factor 2.5. This holds for both, 23 There are revenue-distribution mechanisms in place in the Bundesliga, but less so than in many US leagues, so that the income distribution tends to be more uneven. For example, while the TV rights are sold collectively and the revenue is then shared among all teams according to a pre-defined sharing rule, unlike many US leagues, there is no sharing of gate revenues which heavily favors the teams with the biggest stadiums.
the whole sample and, in case of dismissals, for the degrees of heterogeneity which new managers inherit from their predecessors. Figure 2 illustrates the average player performance (grades) in homogenous and heterogenous teams 25 : As would be expected, heterogenous teams exhibit slightly better grades at the top performance ranks, while the grades in homogenous teams, being more balanced, are better at the lower performance ranks. Overall, these differences appear to be small. 26 While this suggests that heterogeneity in itself has no sizeable impact on performance, it will turn out that, consistent with our main hypothesis, it does become important when a manager is dismissed. 26 This may for instance be due to the fact that team homogeneity comes with a cost. On the one hand, the degree of within-team competition may be larger in homogenous teams. But on the other hand, the quality of the players at the lower ranks is more similar to those in the starting line-up so that, on a competitive labor market, the same must be true for their salaries. With a given budget, a more homogenous team will then be naturally associated with a lower average player quality in the starting line-up. Figure 4 shows the average of the number of points won in the six games before and after dismissal for all teams with a within-season dismissal, suggesting a negative trend in performance as a key source of managerial change which points at the importance of controlling for the exact short-term sequence of performance to exclude mean reversion as a driver of the observed performance increase. Importantly, our key hypothesis that positive succession effects emerge in homogenous rather than heterogenous teams, should not be driven by mean reversion. Rather, as argued by Höffler and Sliwka (2003) , managerial change should be more successful in homogenous teams where it is easier for the new manager to re-vive the competition for the available slots as players are operating in a now more competitive environment.
In contrast, when there is a large difference in abilities between the top players in the team and the rest, a new manager will basically have to pick the same starting line-up as his predecessor so that within-team competition cannot be triggered anew through a dismissal.
As a first step in assessing the validity of our main hypothesis, panel (b) of Figure   4 plots again the average number of points achieved in the last six games before and after a dismissal but, in contrast to panel (a), separately for homogenous and heterogenous teams. Strikingly, while both groups show a very similar performance dip prior to dismissal (with a slightly better performance for heterogenous teams), the performance increase in the first matches under the new manager is larger in homogenous teams.
Moreover, the fact that this difference seems to vanish again after the first matches under the new manager is also in line with the theory: after some time in office, the new manager will again have made up his mind about his most preferred team composition and, in turn, within-team competition should again become weaker. These issues will be investigated in more detail in the following.
Results
Coach Dismissals and Team Performance
As explained above, we estimate lower boundaries to the causal effect of coach dismissals on team performance. Our main hypothesis is that dismissals should increase performance to a stronger extent in homogeneous teams. Note that we can test this hypotheses both with the data from home and away teams. In turn, we expect that the coefficient for the interaction term between our measure of heterogeneity (het) and the dummy for managerial change (new) should be negative for home teams and positive for away teams. We estimate three different models, looking at the new manager's first 2, 4 and 6 match types (home and away), respectively.
The regression results are shown in Table 2 , and they provide strong support for the main hypothesis. All coefficients of the interaction terms have the expected sign and, with one exception, are also statistically significant. Moreover, and in line with the descriptive statistics (see Figure 2 ), heterogeneity in itself seems unrelated to performance; it plays a crucial role only when a manager is dismissed.
In a next step, we investigate the economic significance of the dismissal effect, depending on the degree of heterogeneity of the respective team. To do this we center the het home and het away variables at different percentiles (10, 25,, 50, 75, 90 -see Table   1 for the respective values) of their distributions and then estimate again the New home dummy, which then yields a lower bound on the average treatment effect in home games for teams at this percentile. To evaluate the effect of dismissals on away performance, Table 6 in Appendix A reports the results of a second regression with the same set of covariates, but with the number of points won by the away team as the dependent variable. 27 Applying the same approach to these models we obtain the average treatment effect in away games for teams at the respective percentiles. The overall average effect of a dismissal on the respective teams' performance per match of either type is then the average of the respective coefficients for New home from Table 2 and New away from Table 6 (centering the heterogeneity measure het at the respective percentile). The results are shown in Table 3 .
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As conjectured, Table 3 reveals that there are highly significant and substantial average dismissal effects (only) for homogenous teams, that is, at the lower percentiles of 27 Note that the number of points lost by the home teams are not identical to the number of points gained by the away teams as the winner (loser) of a match gets 3 (0) points, while each team gets 1 point in case of a draw.
28 For example, the entries in the first row (het = 0) are directly calculated as the average of the two coefficients in Tables 2 (New home) and 6 (New away), so that for the first column we get Because the set of covariates is identical in both estimations, we obtain the same coefficients when estimating a system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), see e.g., Greene (1997, pp. 676) . This approach also allows us to test the joint significance of New home (Table 2 ) and New away ( New is calculated as the average of the respective coefficient(s) involving New home in Table 2 and New away in Table 6 . The p-values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors and estimated based on SUR regressions (Stata command suest). We also considered a number of alternative measures of the teams' heterogeneity to study the robustness of the results. Table Appendix B replicates the results from Table   3 for each of the alternative measures. While the size of the coefficients varies to some extent the results are qualitatively very robust. For instance, the estimate for the average increase in the number of points in the next four matches at the 10% percentile in terms of heterogeneity is 0.206 for the coefficient of variation or 0.226 for the Gini coefficient.
Last, but not least, disentangling this overall average effect of a dismissal into home and away performance reveals that it is mainly driven by performance increases in away games. 29 One interpretation for this result is that in home games the players' motivation is substantially higher in any case because of the monitoring, support or even pressure from the team's own fans (recall that home team wins occur twice as often as away wins and draws). Hence, the additional motivational push from intra-team competition from a coach replacement in a homogenous team seems to be stronger in away games where these other motivational mechanisms are weaker.
Coach Dismissals and Individual Players' Performance
Apart from the performance impact of managerial succession on the (aggregate) team level, an alternative route is to directly consider the (individual) player level and see whether there is any measurable direct impact on the players' grades. Consistent with our underlying mechanism based on within-team competition, we would expect a stronger response of players in the "contested" ranks. i.e. those close to rank 11 which are the weakest players on the team or the strongest on the bench, but a weak response among the top players as they will most certainly also be part of the starting line up under a new coach. Moreover, as for the impact of team heterogeneity, this effect should be stronger in more homogenous teams.
In this respect, Figure 5 plots the changes of grades for the players at the different performance ranks (again using the average grades obtained so far) in response to dis- This phenomenon is naturally explained by mean reversion of players who received top grades in the past have less scope to improve and vice-versa those at rather lower ranks have more scope for improvements. But the important observation here is that these differences are bigger in homogenous teams, in particular for those players in the contested ranks starting with rank 8. Moreover, from panel (b) and in line with our previous finding, we observe that the "new broom effect" seems to disappear after the tenure of the new manager increases. To investigate this issue in more detail we estimated the performance change of individual players around a coach dismissal. We first constructed a data set containing all players of teams in which a coach has been replaced within a season. The dependent variable is the difference between the average grade in first 4 matches under new manager and that in all matches (in a given season) under old one. The key independent variables are a dummy indicating whether the team's homogeneity is above average as well as the player's rank prior to the dismissal. The key hypotheses is that grade improvements due to coach replacements are stronger (i) in more homogenous teams and (ii) for players at the lower performance ranks. Table 4 : Impact of Dismissals on Individual Performance
The regression results (with standard errors clustered at each separate coach dismissal) are shown in Table 4 , and they confirm these hypotheses: As can be seen from the first column, the change in player performance as a result of managerial change is on average stronger for homogenous teams and for players at lower ranks (at the time of dismissal). More importantly, in the second column, we include an interaction term between team homogeneity and performance rank. This term is positive, thereby supporting the hypothesis that the change in performance at the more contested lower ranks is stronger for homogenous teams. Hence, managerial change seems most effective in this segment of the roster and for homogenous teams, as there the effect of better performance due to increased within-team competition is strongest. Note that these effects cannot driven by mean reversion, as in homogenous teams the players at these ranks tend to perform better prior to a replacement (see Figure 2 ), which makes it harder for them to attain further performance increases.
The Impact of Team Heterogeneity Under Interim Managers
Recall that we have excluded interim managers from the main analysis, because their spell was usually very short (on average a mere 2.3 matches) and, more importantly, they are typically known to be interim solutions, only responsible for the team until the arrival of the "real" replacement for the old manager and mostly they have worked for the same club before -typically as an assistant to the outgoing coach. Given their very short tenure as responsible coach and given that they are typically well acquainted with the players, our theory based on within-team competition would predict that new interim managers are less successful in triggering within-competition anew compared to those new managers who are hired from the outside and expected to stay for longer. 31 As a result, and in contrast to our main findings as reported in Table 2 , we should expect to keeper, defender, midfielder and forward) and controls for past team performance prior to the dismissal:
the average points accumulated so far in the current season (Perf season) and in the last 4 matches before the dismissal (Perf recent).
see no sizeable effect of team heterogeneity on team performance when an interim coach takes over. Table 5 shows the results of the same regressions as above with an additional dummy indicating whether or not the new manager is an interim coach. Indeed, the interaction terms are not significant for interim managers so that, in contrast to their more permanent counterparts, there is no effect with respect to team heterogeneity.
Conclusion
The allocation of tasks to subordinates is a core management responsibility not only in sports but nearly any kind of organization. When subordinates have preferences on tasks of different importance, subordinates compete for the most important tasks that for instance may help to advance their careers. And this competition can be a powerful incentive mechanism. However, it will crucially depend upon the manager's allocation choices. As shown by Höffler and Sliwka (2003) , a manager who knows his subordinates very well will assign the most important tasks to the subordinate she perceives to be the most able. However, when this is transparent, competition among the subordinates will be rather weak as their roles are more or less fixed. In such a situation, dismissing the manager may trigger the competition for attractive tasks anew. A new manager who does not know the talents of her subordinates as precisely as her predecessor will have to make up her mind on the subordinates' talents. In turn the subordinates have a strong incentive to exert effort to convince the new manager of their abilities. We have explored this mechanism empirically in professional sports, a field where it should be of substantial importance as picking a subset of players from a larger team is a core management task of any coach. Our key hypothesis was that coach replacements have a stronger effect on team performance in more homogenous teams compared to heterogenous ones. Indeed we found that coach replacements are beneficial when the abilities of the weakest players just on the team and the strongest ones on the bench are similar.
This result has direct implications for the decision to replace coaches in professional sports. It is notable that in many sports, it is used as a key mechanism to boost perfor- give some insights for the theory of tournaments or contests. A key theoretical result established in the literature on contests and tournaments is that competition creates the strongest incentives when players are rather homogenous. Our observations are well in line with this result. Moreover, the results hint at a mechanism how homogeneity can be increased in the real world even when the set of contestants cannot be changed: replacing the decision maker to reinvigorate the race for attractive positions by "destroying" some information on relative performance differences.
Finally, the paper also yields some methodological insights concerning the econometric evaluation of the effect of managerial change on performance. 
Finally, in the last two panels, we use the coefficient of variation (g 5 it ) and the Gini coefficient (g 6 it ). As teams have different roster sizes and hence differ with respect to the number of graded players at each match day, for the sake of comparison both measures are based on the team with the minimum number of graded players up to match day t. 32 To see the reason note the following example: When comparing a team of say 7 strong and 8 weak players with another one which is twice as large with 14 strong and 16 weak players, then both have exactly the same Gini. But as only 11 players (plus substitutes) can be fielded, the second team should be regarded as much more homogenous regarding the competition for one of these positions.
by the average value of all teams at match day t. Table 7 provides some summary information on these alternative heterogeneity measures, which are then used in the regressions reported in Table 8 . As can be seen, for all these alternative measures, the results are very similar to those reported in Table 3 , so that we consider our insights to be robust in that respect. 
